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How	will	the	European	Commission	triggering	Article
7	affect	Polish	politics?
Last	month	Poland	became	the	first	EU	member	state	to	have	an	Article	7	rule	of	law	procedure
launched	against	it.	Aleks	Szczerbiak	writes	that	while	sanctions	appear	extremely	unlikely,	the
domestic	political	impact	will	depend	on	whether	Poles	accept	the	opposition’s	argument	that	the
government	is	isolating	Poland	internationally,	or	the	ruling	party’s	claim	that	it	is	defending	national
sovereignty	against	EU	interference	in	the	country’s	internal	affairs.
Credit:	Arkadiusz	Sikorski	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)
At	the	end	of	December,	in	a	major	escalation	of	a	conflict	with	Poland	that	has	been	rumbling	on	for	the	past	two
years,	the	European	Commission	recommended	triggering	the	so-called	Article	7	procedure,	the	first	ever	against	an
EU	member	state.	This	followed	its	criticisms	of	the	Polish	government	–	led,	since	autumn	2015,	by	the	right-wing
Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	party	–	as	posing	a	threat	to	the	rule	of	law.	The	Commission’s	original	concerns	stemmed
from	a	dispute	over	appointments	to,	and	the	functioning	of,	Poland’s	constitutional	tribunal,	but	since	last	July
escalated	to	include	the	government’s	controversial	judicial	reform	programme.	The	Commission	argued	that,	as	a
result	of	a	set	of	13	laws	passed	by	the	Law	and	Justice-dominated	parliament,	the	ruling	party	had	undermined	the
independence	of	the	judiciary	which	meant	that	the	constitutionality	of	the	country’s	legislation	could	no	longer	be
guaranteed.
Warning	of	a	drift	towards	authoritarian	rule,	Poland’s	main	opposition	groupings	–	led	by	the	liberal-centrist	Civic
Platform	(PO),	the	governing	party	from	2017-15	–	and	the	legal	establishment,	have	accused	Law	and	Justice	of
failing	to	respect	the	Constitution	and	separation	of	powers.	They	argue	that	the	government’s	judicial	reforms	and
other	actions	have	subverted	democratic	values	by	allowing	the	ruling	party	to	pack	the	courts	with	its	own	hand-
picked	nominees.	In	addition	to	launching	the	Article	7	procedure,	the	Commission	also	confirmed	that	it	would	refer
Poland	to	the	European	Court	of	Justice	for	an	alleged	infringement	of	EU	law,	arguing	that	legislation	changing	the
way	that	the	heads	of	lower	district	and	appeal	courts	are	appointed	gives	the	Polish	justice	minister	too	much	power
and	is	discriminatory	because	it	introduces	separate	retirement	ages	for	men	and	women
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The	government’s	supporters	responded	by	saying	that	Poland	was	as	committed	to	the	rule	of	law	as	any	other	EU
country	and	that	its	actions	were	in	line	with	the	Polish	Constitution.	They	argued	that	judicial	reforms	were	sorely
needed	because	Polish	courts	were	too	slow,	inefficient	and	tolerated	frequent	irregularities.	Law	and	Justice
believes	that,	following	the	country’s	flawed	transition	to	democracy	in	1989,	the	judiciary,	like	many	key	institutions,
was	already	politicised	and	expropriated	by	a	well-entrenched,	and	often	deeply	corrupt,	post-communist	elite,	which
then	co-opted	a	new	legal	establishment	that	perpetuated	its	legacy.	They	also	accused	the	Commission	of	double
standards	arguing	that	the	Polish	government’s	reforms	were	in	line	with	practices	that	existed	in	many	other
established	Western	democracies,	and	that	Brussels	was	biased	and	acting	on	political	motives	because	Law	and
Justice	has	challenged	the	interests	of	the	major	EU	powers	and	is	out	of	favour	with	the	socially	liberal	and
cosmopolitan	policies	supported	by	the	EU	political	establishment.
Law	and	Justice	won’t	back	down
The	Commission’s	latest	move	shifts	the	‘rule	of	law’	dispute	to	the	EU	inter-governmental	level	but	no	firm	date	has
been	set	for	member	states	to	vote	on	its	recommendation,	allowing	some	space	for	diplomatic	efforts.	The
Commission	has	also	said	that	if	the	Polish	government	reverses	its	legislative	changes	within	the	next	three	months
it	could	rescind	its	decision.	However,	within	hours	of	the	Commission’s	announcement,	Poland’s	Law	and	Justice-
backed	President	Andrzej	Duda	signed	into	law	the	two	judicial	reform	bills	whose	earlier	approval	by	the	Polish
parliament	Brussels	felt	marked	a	point	of	no	return.	One	of	these	potentially	ended	the	tenure	of	around	40%	of
current	Supreme	Court	judges	by	lowering	their	retirement	age	from	70	to	65,	with	the	President	deciding	if	their
terms	could	be	extended.	The	other	reformed	the	National	Judicial	Council	(KRS),	a	body	that	selects	judges	and
decides	how	the	courts	are	run,	so	that	most	of	its	members	were	elected	by	parliament	rather	than	judicial	bodies.
Earlier	last	month,	Poland’s	finance	minister	and	respected	former	banker	Mateusz	Morawiecki	was	also	appointed
as	the	country’s	new	prime	minister	partly	in	the	hope	that	he	would	be	able	to	‘re-set’	Warsaw’s	relations	with	the
EU	political	establishment.	Due	to	his	excellent	international	business	contacts,	Mr	Morawiecki	understands	the
mentality	of	Western	elites	and	generates	their	respect	for	his	competence	and	professionalism.	However,	judicial
reform	is	one	of	the	most	important	elements	of	Law	and	Justice’s	programme	to	radically	re-construct	the	Polish
state.	Although	Mr	Morawiecki’s	greater	familiarity	with	diplomatic	niceties	should	enable	him	to	develop	better
contacts	with	Western	politicians,	the	new	prime	minister’s	statements	since	his	appointment	make	it	clear	that,	other
than	adopting	a	somewhat	gentler	rhetorical	tone,	the	government	does	not	intend	to	change	course	even	if	this
brings	it	into	conflict	with	the	EU	elites.
No	sanctions,	but	Poland	marginalised?
Member	states	are	likely	to	vote	on	whether	to	enact	Article	7	at	an	EU	General	Affairs	Council	meeting	scheduled
for	the	end	of	February.	In	the	first	stage	of	the	procedure	the	decision	on	whether	the	Polish	reforms	constitute	a
‘clear	risk	of	a	serious	breach	of	rule	of	law’	requires	the	support	of	22	of	the	EU’s	remaining	27	members	(Poland	is
excluded	from	the	vote)	to	move	to	the	next	stage.	Given	that	France	and	Germany	have	already	signalled	that	they
will	back	the	Commission,	most	other	EU	states	are	likely	to	fall	into	line,	so	blocking	the	Article	7	procedure	at	this
stage	would	be	a	huge	diplomatic	triumph	for	Law	and	Justice	and	Mr	Morawiecki.	However,	a	subsequent	vote	to
trigger	sanctions	against	Poland	–	including,	in	the	worst-case	scenario,	suspending	the	country’s	European	Council
voting	rights	–	requires	unanimity	and	the	Hungarian	government,	for	one,	has	made	it	clear	that	it	will	oppose	such	a
move.
Nonetheless,	Law	and	Justice’s	critics	argue	that	even	if	no	sanctions	are	eventually	imposed	the	Article	7	procedure
will	further	damage	Poland’s	international	reputation	and	undermine	the	government’s	ability	to	advance	the
country’s	interests	on	other	issues	such	as	the	distribution	of	EU	funds	when	states	begin	negotiating	the	2021-27
EU	budget	later	this	year.	Poland	is	the	main	beneficiary	from	these	fiscal	transfers	but	the	current	EU	budget	was
always	likely	to	be	the	last	from	which	the	country	would	gain	so	substantially,	given	that	British	withdrawal	from	the
Union	will	reduce	the	overall	level	of	the	funding	available.	At	the	same	time,	some	EU	leaders	and	officials	have
argued	that	the	disbursal	of	Union	funds	should	reflect	the	extent	to	which	countries	are	felt	to	uphold	so-called
‘European	values’,	including	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law.	For	its	part,	Law	and	Justice	argues	that,	as	EU	budgets
require	unanimity,	Poland	can	prevent	any	attempts	to	develop	such	linkages,	although	some	commentators	say	that
this	can	be	by-passed.
Support	for	the	EU	is	broad	but	shallow
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The	question	of	whose	interpretation	of	the	meaning	of	the	dispute	between	Poland	and	the	EU	political
establishment	Poles	come	to	accept	will	be	one	of	the	most	important	arenas	of	political	conflict	in	the	country’s
politics	over	the	coming	months.	While	they	are	extremely	critical	of	the	way	that	the	courts	and	legal	institutions
function	in	their	country,	Poles	are	much	more	divided	on	the	merits	of	Law	and	Justice’s	specific	judicial	reforms.
They	are	also,	on	the	face	of	it,	overwhelmingly	pro-EU:	a	December	2017	survey	by	the	CBOS	polling	agency	found
that	85%	of	respondents	supported	their	country’s	EU	membership	compared	with	only	8%	against.	However,	Poles
are	more	wary	about	the	idea	of	EU	institutions	becoming	involved	in	the	country’s	internal	affairs	and	are	likely	to	be
extremely	hostile	if	they	perceive	that	the	government’s	domestic	political	opponents	are	trying	to	settle	Polish
disputes	in	international	forums.	Many	are	also	sympathetic	to	Law	and	Justice’s	claim	that	the	Commission’s
criticisms	of	the	Polish	government	are	motivated,	in	part	at	least,	by	Warsaw’s	rejection	of	what	they	see	as	the
hegemonic	EU	liberal-left	consensus	in	the	moral-cultural	sphere	that	undermines	Poland’s	traditional	values	and
national	identity.
Moreover,	some	commentators	argue	that	Polish	public	support	for	the	EU	is	very	broad	but	also	rather	shallow,	with
Poles	increasingly	instrumental	in	their	attitudes	towards	membership.	A	key	motivation	for	their	voting
overwhelmingly	for	EU	accession	in	a	2003	referendum	was	the	idea	it	represented	a	historical	and	civilisational
choice	to	re-unite	with	the	West	and	the	culmination	of	the	post-communist	democratisation	process.	However,	this
idea	of	EU	membership	as	a	natural	and	obvious	civilisational	choice	has	been	undermined	in	recent	years	due	to	an
increasing	sense	of	cultural	distinctiveness	that	many	Poles	feel	towards	Western	Europe.
This	issue	surfaced	in	the	reaction	of	Poles	(and	other	Central	Europeans)	to	the	EU’s	compulsory	migrant	relocation
scheme	developed	in	response	to	the	2015	migration	crisis.	An	overwhelming	majority	of	Poles	oppose	accepting
refugees	(never	mind	economic	migrants)	from	Muslim	countries	even	if	Poland	is	threatened	with	financial	penalties
by	the	EU	for	refusing	to	do	so.	Poles,	therefore,	view	the	European	integration	process	increasingly	in	terms	of	a
cost-benefit	analysis	with	the	extent	to	which	Poland	benefits	from	EU	fiscal	transfers	obviously	a	key	element	of	this.
Marginalising	Poland	or	defending	national	sovereignty?
How	the	triggering	of	Article	7	will	play	out	in	Polish	domestic	politics,	therefore,	depends	critically	on	who	frames	the
terms	of	the	debate	on	this	issue	most	successfully,	and	particularly	whose	arguments	Poles	find	most	convincing	as
to	who	is	to	blame	for	(the	threat	of)	EU	sanctions	or	reduced	fiscal	transfers.
The	government’s	opponents	will	obviously	continue	to	argue	that	Law	and	Justice’s	dispute	with	the	EU	political
establishment	is	about	fundamental	constitutional	issues	because	the	ruling	party	has	violated	basic	liberal
democratic	norms.	But	they	will	also	try	to	present	Poland’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU	as	one	of	the	key	issues
at	stake.	They	will	argue	that,	at	worst,	Law	and	Justice	is	preparing	the	ground	for	‘Polexit’:	Poland	following	the
UK’s	example	and	leaving	the	EU.	But	they	will	also	say	that,	even	if	the	country	formally	remains	an	EU	member,	it
could	become	so	marginalised	within	the	Union’s	decision	making	structures	that	a	process	of	‘slow	motion’	or	‘de
facto’	Polexit	will	develop:	with	Poland	progressively	weakening	its	ties	with	the	Union	in	a	way	that	undermines	its
economic	and	geo-political	interests.
The	government’s	supporters	will,	on	the	other	hand,	continue	to	vigorously	deny	that	Law	and	Justice	has	any	plans
for	‘Polexit’,	while	framing	the	Article	7	debate	in	terms	of	a	defence	of	national	sovereignty.	They	will	argue	that
Poland’s	dispute	with	the	Commission	is	a	political	one	and	not	about	the	rule	of	law,	while	presenting	the
government	as	the	defender	of	Polish	national	interests	against	the	EU	political	establishment’s	interference	in	the
country’s	domestic	affairs.	This	narrative	not	only	solidifies	Law	and	Justice’s	support	among	its	core	voter	base,	it
also	potentially	casts	the	government’s	opponents	in	a	negative	light	in	the	eyes	of	less	politically	committed	Poles.
While	the	government’s	opponents	are	keen	to	use	their	close	links	with	the	EU	political	elites,	who	share	their	dislike
of	Law	and	Justice,	to	exert	pressure	on	the	ruling	party	by	presenting	it	as	isolated	within	the	Union,	this	also	leaves
them	open	to	criticism	that	they	are	themselves	undermining	Poland’s	international	standing	by	involving	Union
institutions	in	domestic	political	disputes.	If	the	government	can	persuade	Poles	to	interpret	the	Article	7	procedure	in
this	way	then	playing	the	‘rule	of	law’	card	could	end	up	backfiring	on	both	the	EU	political	establishment	and	Law
and	Justice’s	domestic	opponents.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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